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Market professionals with decades of experience typically argue that a call option is a surrogate for 
the underlying asset, indicating that they perceive the risk of a call option as similar to the risk of the 
underlying asset. Experimental evidence also points to the same conclusion. Such relative risk 
perception is in sharp contrast with finance theory, which argues that only the absolute quantity of 
risk contained in a call option should matter for its price. I show that relative risk perception 
provides a potential explanation for the puzzling performance of covered call writing. 
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Relative Risk Perception and the Puzzle of Covered Call Writing 
 
The profitability of covered call writing (one long stock plus one short call) is puzzling given the 
predictions of finance theory. Whaley (2002) examines the profitability of BXM (a Buy Write 
Monthly Index tracking a Covered Call on S&P 500) over a period ranging from 1988 to 2001 and 
find that BXM has significantly lower historical volatility when compared with the index, however, it 
has offered nearly the same return as the index.  
Informational efficiency requires that markets equilibrate to the point where the risk adjusted 
returns from all assets are equal. It follows that, in an informationally efficient market, covered call 
writing should offer lower returns when compared with just holding the underlying stock, as covered 
call has lower risk than the underlying stock. A pre-requisite for informational efficiency is that all 
risks are correctly perceived. Correct perception requires that one forms a judgment regarding the 
total quantity of risk associated with any given asset. However, risk is a highly subjective notion, and 
the argument that risks are commonly misperceived in various contexts is frequently made. See 
Rotheli (2010), Bhattacharya, Goldman, & Sood (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), and Barberis & 
Thaler (2002) among many others. For a broad survey of research on the psychology of risk from 
behavioral finance perspective, see Ricciardi (2008).  
 We have been hired-wired to think via analogies and comparisons. In fact, such thinking has 
been called the core of cognition and the fuel and fire of thinking by cognitive scientists and 
psychologists. See Hofstadter and Sander (2013). 
Weber (2004) writes, “First, perceived risk appears to be subjective, and in its subjectivity, causal. That 
is, people’s behavior is mediated by their perception of risk. Second, risk perception, like all other perception, is relative. 
We seem to be hard-wired for relative rather than absolute evaluation. Relative judgments require comparisons, so 
many of our judgment are comparative in nature even in situations where economic rationality would ask for absolute 
judgments.” (p. 172). 
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There is strong field evidence suggesting that relative risk perception matters for call options. 
Specifically, it is common to find market professionals with decades of experience who argue that a 
call option is a surrogate for the underlying stock, and who typically consider call risk to be quite 
similar to and often no greater than the risk of the underlying stock.1 Furthermore, findings from 
controlled laboratory experiments also indicate that participants consider call option risk as similar 
to the underlying stock risk, and expect similar returns from them. See Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi 
(2011), and Siddiqi (2012). It must be noted that such analogy making is very tempting as call’s 
payoffs are strongly related to the underlying stock’s payoffs. 
In this article, I show that if the risk of a call option is perceived as similar to the risk of the 
underlying stock, then covered call writing is a lot more profitable strategy than what the theory 
(based on absolute risk judgments) suggests. Hence, relative risk perception provides a potential 
explanation for the puzzling historical performance of covered call writing. 
The central prediction of asset pricing theory is: 
         
 
           
                                                                                            (0.1) 
Where    and    denote the return on a risky asset and the return on the risk free asset respectively. 
Equation (0.1) shows that the return that a subjective expected utility maximizer expects from a risky 
asset depends on his belief about the covariance of the asset’s return with his marginal utility of 
consumption. Hence, one is required to form judgment about the total risk of a risky asset, which is 
given by the covariance of one’s marginal utility of consumption with the return of the risky asset. 
Theory requires that such judgments are formed for all available assets individually. It is difficult to 
see how one can go about doing that individually for all assets. It’s more likely that such judgments 
are formed for a more familiar asset, and then by analogy, extended to another similar asset.  A call 
option by definition is strongly related to the underlying stock, and it seems reasonable to think that 
                                                          
1
 A few examples of investment professionals arguing that a call option is a surrogate for the underlying asset are: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/stock-replacement-strategy-reduce-risk-142949569.html 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, 
http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/ 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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risk judgments are extrapolated from stocks to call options, which are instruments derived from 
stocks. 
 In this article, relative risk perception means that one uses the risk of the corresponding underlying 
stock as a reference point for forming judgments regarding the risk of a call option.  In contrast, absolute risk 
perception implies that one does not use such a reference point in forming risk judgments.  
 Relative judgment matters because it is typical for one to fail to adjust fully when starting 
from a reference point. That is, there is an automatic inclination to latch onto the reference point, 
and only deviate slightly from it. This is known as the “anchoring” heuristic. Anchoring effect is one 
of the most robust cognitive heuristics. 40 years of extensive research on the topic has shown it to 
be applicable to a wide variety of decision contexts. See Furnham, A., and Boo, H. C. (2011) for a 
literature review on anchoring.  
Anchoring implies that using the risk of the corresponding underlying stock as a reference 
point for forming beliefs about the risk of a call option leads to an underestimation of risk. Such 
underestimation increases the price of the call option. Hence, covered call writing becomes more 
profitable.     
 If one forms a judgment about call option risk in comparison with his judgment about the 
underlying stock risk (relative risk perception), then one may write: 
                      
                                                                                       (0.2) 
Where    and    are call and stock returns respectively, and   is the (small) adjustment used to 
arrive at call option risk from the underlying stock risk. Almost always, assets pay more (less) when 
consumption is high (less), hence, the covariance between an asset’s return and marginal utility of 
consumption is negative. That is, I assume that                   . So, in order to make a call 
option at least as risky as the underlying stock, I assume    . 
In contrast, as call option is a leveraged position in the underlying stock, if the risk of call 
option and the underlying stock are separately considered (absolute risk perception) in isolation as 
assumed in theory, then one should expect: 
                        
                                                                                       (0.3) 
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Where     and typically takes very large values. That is, typically    . To appreciate, the 
difference between (0.3) and (0.2), note that under the Black Scholes assumptions,    , which is 
call option elasticity w.r.t the underlying stock price. Ω takes very large values, especially for out-of-
the-money call options. That is                  is a far bigger negative number with absolute risk 
judgment than with relative risk perception. Hence, a comparison of (0.2) and (0.3) indicates that, 
with relative risk perception, one remains anchored to the risk of the underlying stock while forming 
risk judgments about the call option leading to underestimation of its risk.  
Shouldn’t rational investors who form absolute risk judgments arbitrage away investors 
prone to relative risk perceptions? Barberis and Thaler (2002) argue that the absence of “free lunch” 
does not imply that prices are right. Relative risk perception creates a clear “free lunch” only if the 
underlying stock price follows geometric Brownian motion and there are no transaction costs. That 
is, if we are living in the Black Scholes world. Neither the assumption of “geometric Brownian 
motion” nor the assumption of “having zero transaction costs’ is defensible. Moving away from 
geometric Brownian motion to a more realistic process such as jump diffusion implies that an 
option cannot be replicated by other assets (see Merton (1976)). And, dropping the assumption of 
zero transaction cost implies that the total cost of replication grows without bound in continuous 
time (see Soner, Shreve, and Cvitanic (1995)). Hence, realistically, relative risk perception does not 
create a “free lunch”. Hence, relative risk perception, which seems to be an in-built human trait, is 
unlikely to go away. 
 
1. Relative Risk Perception and the Return from Covered Call Strategy 
Covered call writing is a long position in the underlying stock combined with a short position in a 
call option (typically, out-of-the-money) on the stock: 
                                                                                                                                   (1.1) 
Where   denotes the underlying stock price, and   is the price of a call option on the stock.  
Over a small time interval,   , the portfolio value changes to: 
                                                                                                                               (1.2) 
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The expected return on the portfolio over a time interval    is given by: 
  
  
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                           (1.3) 
To proceed further, the dynamics of the underlying stock need to be specified. Following Merton 
(1976), I assume that the underlying stock price follows a jump diffusion process, which is a mixture 
of geometric Brownian motion and occasional Poisson jumps: 
                                                                                                                    (1.4) 
                                                                                                                    (1.5) 
Where    is a standard Gauss-Weiner process. Parameters         capture drift and volatility 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                        (1.6) 
Where   is the size of the jump, and: 
                          
                              
That is,           
 In other words, the stock price dynamics are assumed to be as described by geometric 
Brownian motion interspersed with occasional jumps. When a jump happens, which happens with a 
probability    , the stock price jumps to   . For simplicity, I assume that jumps are symmetrically 
distributed around the current stock price. That is,       . 
Substituting (1.5) and (1.6) into (1.4), one gets: 
                                                                                                               (1.7) 
In the same fashion as discussed above, one can write for the value of the covered call 
portfolio: 
                                                                                                                     (1.8) 
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                     (1.9) 
(1.9) uses Ito’s lemma and makes a substitution from (1.5). 
                           
                                                                                               (1.10) 
Substituting (1.9) and (1.10) into (1.8) and taking expectations (assumption: probability of jump and 
jump size are independent), one gets: 
            
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                    (1.11) 
Hence, (1.3) can be expressed as: 
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                        
   
                                                             (1.12) 
The above equation is a general formulation for the expected return from covered call writing under 
jump diffusion. Up to this point, nothing has been assumed about how one forms risk judgments 
(either relative or absolute), and consequently, nothing has been said about the expected return from 
the call option. 
 To set up a benchmark for assessing the implications of relative risk perception, I consider 
the following two cases:  
1) If absolute risk judgments (correct risk judgments) are formed, what is the expected return from 
covered call under the Black Scholes assumptions? 
2) What is the expected return from covered call under the Jump Diffusion model with absolute risk 
judgments? 
 To see how the expected return from covered call changes with relative risk judgments, I 
consider relative risk judgments both in the Black Scholes and in Jump Diffusion settings separately. 
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1.1 Absolute Risk Judgment and Covered Call: The Black Scholes Case 
If jump intensity is zero, that is,    , the jump diffusion model reduces to the Black Scholes 
model, so (1.12) becomes: 
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
   
   
                                                                                           (1.13) 
The Black Scholes PDE is: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                                        (1.14) 
Substituting (1.14) into (1.13) and realizing that call option elasticity w.r.t the underlying stock price 
is   
 
 
  
  
, leads to the following: 
  
  
 
  
                  
   
                                                                                                     (1.15) 
As    , the expected return from covered call is smaller than the expected return from the 
underlying stock. In fact, Ω takes very large values for out-of-the-money calls. This means that 
covered call writing should have substantially low return when compared with the underlying stock, 
as covered call writing typically involves out-of-the-money calls.  
The empirical finding that covered call returns are similar to the underlying stock returns then 
implies either of the following:  
a) The Black Scholes assumptions regarding the underlying stock dynamics are wrong. 
b) Actual risk perception is different from absolute risk judgment as assumed in theory. 
c) Both a and b are true. 
Next, I keep the assumption of absolute risk judgment, and show what happens to the expected 
return from covered call writing under the more realistic assumption of jump diffusion.  
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1.2 Absolute Risk Judgment and Covered Call: Jump Diffusion 
If jump risk is priced, then the jump diffusion PDE is given by: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
                                                                        (1.16) 
Where        is the expected return from the call option when the jump risk is priced.  
If the jump risk is not priced, then the expected return from call with jump diffusion should 
be equal to                . That is, it should equal the expected return under the Black 
Scholes case. It follows that if additional risk caused by jumps is priced, then: 
                                                                                                                        (1.17) 
Substituting (1.16) in (1.12) and given (1.17), it follows: 
  
  
 
  
              
   
 
                  
   
                                                                        (1.18) 
Hence, adding jumps worsens the covered call puzzle, as the expected return from covered call with 
jump diffusion is even lower than the expected return under the Black Scholes assumptions. 
Historical covered call performance is consequently a major challenge to theory, as it cannot be 
explained by relaxing Black Scholes assumptions regarding the stock dynamics. This indicates that 
perhaps relative risk perception is at play here. 
 Next, the implications of relative risk perception for covered call performance are examined 
both under the Black Scholes as well as Jump Diffusion frameworks. 
 
1.3 Relative Risk Perception and Covered Call Writing 
With relative risk perception, the risk of a call option is assessed in comparison with the risk of the 
underlying stock. From (0.1) and (0.2) (assuming negative covariance between stock’s return and 
marginal utility of consumption, and that a call option is considered at least as risky the underlying 
stock), the expected return from a call option over a small interval    is: 
  
  
 
                                                                                                                           (1.19) 
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If the underlying stock follows geometric Brownian motion, then over a small interval   : 
       
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                            (1.20) 
From (1.20) and (1.19), it follows: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                               (1.21) 
Substituting (1.21) in (1.13) yields the expected return from covered call writing with relative risk 
perception if the underlying stock follows geometric Brownian motion: 
  
  
 
  
               
   
                                                                                                        (1.22) 
If    , then the expected return from covered call writing with relative risk perception is exactly 
equal to the expected return from the underlying stock. If    , then the expected return is slightly 
lower. Hence, the empirical finding regarding return from covered call writing is no puzzle with 
relative risk perception. 
 If the underlying follows jump diffusion, then, with relative risk perception, it follows: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
                                                                  (1.23) 
Substituting (1.23) in (1.12) leads to the expected return from covered call writing with relative risk 
perception if the underlying stock follows jump diffusion: 
  
  
 
  
               
   
                                                                                                      (1.24) 
(1.24) is the same as (1.22).  
Hence, the empirical findings regarding covered call writing returns is no puzzle with relative risk 
perception irrespective of the whether the underlying follows geometric Brownian motion or jump 
diffusion. 
Next, I examine the impact of relative risk perception on the volatility of covered call writing 
returns. 
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2. Relative Risk Perception and the Volatility of Covered Call Returns 
The variance of returns from the covered call strategy is given by: 
  
  
 
   
  
 
  
 
                                                                                                                    (1.25) 
Where 
                 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
      
  
  
   
                                                                                                                  (1.26) 
And,       is given in (1.11). 
So, the variance is equal to: 
  
      
  
  
                                                  
   
 
 
                                                (1.27) 
Note, that    and    are assumed to be independent. Also, the probability of jump and jump size 
are independent. Expanding the square, and realizing that as     , higher powers of    converge 
to zero at a faster rate, so higher powers of    can be ignored, and also noting that         
                      , one arrives at the following: 
  
  
 
   
  
 
  
 
                  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
                                                            (1.28) 
Where    is call price elasticity w.r.t the underlying stock price. As     , and  
                  is the volatility of the underlying stock returns, it is easy to see that covered 
call writing returns have lower volatility when compared with the volatility of underlying stock 
returns.  
 (1.28) holds for both relative as well as absolute risk perception. Compared to absolute risk 
perception, relative risk perception lowers    slightly, however, it increases  . Hence, moving to 
relative risk perception from absolute risk perception can potentially lead to both an increase as well 
12 
 
as a decrease in volatility, when compared with the volatility under absolute risk perception. 
However, the volatility remains substantially smaller than the volatility of the underlying stock 
returns in either case as      with both relative as well as absolute risk perception. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The superior historical performance of covered call writing is an important puzzle in option pricing. 
Covered call writing is clearly a risk reducing strategy, so it should offer a lower return than the 
underlying stock in an informationally efficient market. However, empirically, it offers nearly the 
same return as the underlying while volatility of its returns is substantially lower. I show that if the 
risk of the underlying stock is used as a reference point for forming judgments about the risk of a 
call option, then covered call writing becomes substantially more profitable, while volatility of its 
returns remain substantially lower than the volatility of underlying stock returns. Hence, relative risk 
perception provides an explanation for the covered call writing puzzle.  
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